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Abstract 
 
 
 
The economic aspects of civil wars must always be taken into account for the 
implementation of measures to resolve conflicts. In the Somali situation, where a 
salient feature is the absence of a functional central government since the fall of the 
Siyad Barre regime in 1991, the economic stakes are one of the driving forces in 
armed violence, as witnessed by the struggles to gain access to and control of 
resources. These stakes have however evolved over the course of sixteen years of 
warfare. 
 
In the years after the fall of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991 and the intervention of 
United Nations forces (UNOSOM 1 and 2), military subdual of warring factions and 
the division of the country into a multitude of fiefdoms redrew the political stakes so 
that the aim of fighting was not so much to take supremacy by controlling the 
machinery of government as to gain control of national resources and trade 
networks. For some of those in the “war business”, the aim was to uphold a 
situation of lawlessness. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, circumstances to which we shall return enabled 
“traditional” sectors of activity (and sometimes innovating ones as in 
telecommunications, financial trading and air transport) to develop in spite of the 
lack of government institutions. Those who promoted the revived economy 
managed to subdue the warlords and set up original coordination systems to 
compensate for the inconveniences caused by the lack of government. 
 
A third phase which began in the last few years resulted in the setup of groups of 
firms which were particular in that they were able to combine many different types 
of business: mixing legal and illegal business; trading beyond the frontiers of 
Somalia between the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa and, more widely, in the 
global market. 
 
The players in the Somali war economy do not all have the same profile and nor do 
they have the same expectations from the establishment of a central government. 
 
While some of them want to prevent a return of government, others have a more 
ambiguous outlook: it is not government per se the businessmen mistrust so much 
as the reappearance of a partisan collegiate government. 
 
This “government at arm’s length” strategy adopted by the warlords and certain 
businessmen began to be seriously undermined in 2006 with the advent of the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and even more so in 2007 when the Ethiopian army 
established the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
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Accounts by Somali businessmen in Nairobi in July 2007 describe the brief period 
(June to December 2006) of the UIC administration in Mogadishu as a golden age 
for running businesses, even though not all of them subscribe to other aspects of 
the movement (notably ideological). They did not mention any serious interference 
to regulate business, apart from the fact that the UIC leaders had restored real 
security to Mogadishu and most of south central Somalia (especially by getting rid 
of a lot of checkpoints), so legal and illegal trade could carry on (particularly the 
Bakaara-Mogadishu arms trade). The return to security and freedom to do business 
is obviously the best situation Somali businessmen and entrepreneurs could hope 
for. 
 
When the Transitional Federal Government came to power in January 2007, they 
seem to have lost on both scores. 
 
The victory of the TFG army and their powerful Ethiopian allies over the Union of 
Islamic Courts militias undermined the ententes built up between the most powerful 
cartels and upset the positions established by some of the militias and businessmen 
operating in south central Somalia. 
 
The first measures the TFG introduced in the defeated areas awarded to warlords 
who had joined it the running of revenue collecting points (airports, ports, towns 
and villages where taxes and trading licence duty are levied, trade routes, etc.). 
This did not happen smoothly and, at the time of writing, some has still not been 
levied, for example in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Merca where hostilities persist. 
 
Neither the general Somali public nor the warmongers have any illusions about the 
importance of the economic stakes in the national political arena. Both the Somalis 
who lived through the regime of Siyad Barre and those who have only ever known 
the reign of the warlords since 1991, the government is definitively considered as 
an instrument for seizure and accumulation of wealth for the benefit of those who 
hold power. It is also held to be an instrument to subjugate the losers in the race 
for power and of unbridled exploitation of individuals and the country’s resources. 
 
From this point of view, the measures adopted by the TFG since it came to power 
are unlikely to restore the trust of the people and business in government 
institutions. 
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Introduction 
 
Analysis of the economic aspects of armed violence is a necessary step in the 
implementation of measures to resolve conflicts. Yet aid programmes aimed at 
finding a solution and keeping the peace seem to have an undifferentiated attitude 
to mediation between warmongers and focus their intervention on the means of 
disarmament and out-of-context rules of governance.1
 
Since the economic agenda – and in particular rivalry for access to and control of 
resources – is the driving force in many armed conflicts, this aspect must be taken 
into account for their settlement. 
 
It is important to distinguish the different facets of the political economy of armed 
conflicts by identifying the motives of the players in them. 
 
In this Somali case study, we suggest there is a clear distinction between a category 
of players for whom armed conflict is in itself the condition for implementing a 
process of economic and political gain and individuals who develop their business by 
making their own arrangements in a state of warfare and non-governance. 
 
There is a third category of players who are the majority of the civil population and 
whose part in the war economy is dictated by the need to cope. This huge category 
covers not only young enlisted militiamen and gangs of criminals but also the wider 
civil population which develops illegal production and trading businesses in a 
country where the economy is completely unregulated. 
This means that settling the conflict (at the ceasefire stage) is just a first step which 
must be consolidated by bringing in development programmes to smooth the way 
from wartime economy to peacetime economy. 
 
In this note we provide a preliminary analysis of the developments and 
characteristics of the war economy in Somalia. We attempt to identify the main 
players in the war economy and describe their attitudes to the implementation of a 
peace process and restoration of a government in Somalia. 
 
The first part of the note is designed to situate the current forms of the 
political economy of war in Somalia in the long historical context by a brief 
reminder of the political orders established in the past. 
 
We then discuss the main features of the current war economy. 
 
Finally we describe the dynamics and players of the war economy. 
The analyses put forward in these notes apply basically to the regions of south 
central Somalia, site of the bulk of the armed conflict. They do not address the 
regions of Somaliland and Puntland where the situation is completely different. 
                                                 
1 United Nations agencies have thus developed support systems to emerge from conflict based on 
programmes for “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration” of ex-combatants and programmes 
focusing on governance. The issue of disarmament and demobilisation of militias in particular comes 
up against the realities of the political economy of violence, since reintegration of the militiamen 
presupposes that a state of peace will result in access to economic resources (employment, income) 
and social status which compensate for those gained during warfare. 
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1. Power, violence and wealth accumulation over 
time. 
 
An approach via the political economy is a break with two civil war analysis 
frameworks, especially with regard to Africa. 
 
The first type of explanation refers to irrational violence induced by an exaggerated 
sense of identity (ethnic or clan) left over from earlier times. 
 
The second type of explanation addresses modern conflicts as a consequence of 
changes introduced by urbanisation, the market economy and government over the 
20th century. This view often concludes that there is a clash between traditional 
society cloaked in virtue and contemporary chaos caused by the onset of modernity 
(notably state and the market) and its rejection by local societies. 
 
The years of civil war have helped somewhat partly to erode the first view by 
revealing the interactions between armed violence and the economic stakes. 
Humanitarian players in particular were the first to appraise the exploitation of clan 
identity by unscrupulous entrepreneurs with resources enabling them to control 
individuals. It was not so much tribal fervour as the prospect of access to material 
gain – both economic and political – which brought about the formation of family- 
and clan-based militias. 
 
The second type of explanation – violence combined with control of resources – is 
limited by its lack of historical scope. In this view, the Siyad Barre regime (1969 – 
1991) was the major turning point which explains the current social “disarray”. 
 
Actually, though the desperate situation in Somalia is partly due to a relationship 
with government which began during the Siyad Barre regime, many features of the 
current violence find their source way back in time. To grasp the extent of this 
heritage, we have to get away from the beguiling idea of pastoral democracy2 and 
understand three important things: 
 
1°- Contrary to local portrayals stressing the pastoral way of life, Somali societies 
have long since been highly diversified, with the rural (livestock or crop farming) 
confronting the urban3 (mainly in the coastal cities). For centuries these societies 
have worked with changing social networks, intricate resource systems and trade 
routes linking the rural hinterland and coastal marketplaces with the rest of the 
world. 
2°- Contrary to theses which portray government and centralisation processes as 
fundamentally alien to the precolonial Somali political world, study of the long term 
reveals the extent of variation in the political orders which have prevailed (see 
insets 1 and 2). The analysis of historical centralising processes provides some 
interesting feedback for understanding current situations. Thus it appears that 
positions of power in precolonial Somalia were generally formed on the basis of 
                                                 
2 This view of Somali society has an academic basis in the classic work by the British 
anthropologist I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral democracy: a study of pastoralism and politics among 
the Northern Somali, London, Oxford University Press, 1961. 
3 Coastal cities like Mogadishu and Zeila have been involved in international trade since the 
European Middle Ages. They were visited and described by Arabian chroniclers like Ibn 
Battuta as early as the 14th century. 
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control of rural resources and trade routes. Along similar lines, the relationships 
between religious power, clan-based military and economic stakes are not a new 
feature in Somalia (see inset 1). 
 
3°- The forms of violence and predatory practice are recurrent in history, such as 
the Somali wreckers on the Majeerteen coast (now Puntland) in the 19th century, 
and call to mind today’s ransoming of illegal immigrants or piracy (see inset 2). 
 
 
1. Political orders in the history of Somalia. Ajuraan (16th century) and Geledi 
(18th century) sultanships. 
In the 16th century, the Hawiye imams in Somalia rallied the farmers in their clans and took 
control of the pastoral and farming land resources between the Juba and Shabelle rivers. They 
subsequently extended their control to the trade routes leading to the coastal city of Mogadishu. 
They founded the Ajuraan sultanship which predominated in the southern regions of the current 
Somali republic until the early 18th century. Alliances through marriages contracted between 
reigning sultan families and families of traders in Mogadishu sealed the pacts of interest in trade 
networks between the main holders of power in the region. 
 
The Geledi sultanship was established in the late 18th century in the current region of Benaadir 
(the Mogadishu hinterland). The bases of this establishment were essentially the same as the 
foregoing: Somali imams joined with hinterland clans (the Rahanweyn in this instance) and took 
control of farming resources and trade routes. In the 1840s, the imams took over the Shangaani 
district of Mogadishu. The development of trading companies boosted the plantation economy in 
the hinterland between 1840 and 1870, with a spin-off in an increase in slavery in the region. 
 
Source: Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society. Reconstructing the past of a pastoral 
people, 1500-1900. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. 1982. 
 
2. Political orders in the history of Somalia. Building of the Majeerteen 
sultanship (19th century). 
The Majeerteen sultanship first began in the 16th century and took off, after many ups and 
downs, in the early 19th century under the rule of the older branch of the Ismaan Maxamuud 
fraction of the clan. The build-up of their power was initially founded on the monopoly they held 
over fortuitous resources – loot from ships which were overwhelmed by the currents round Cape 
Guardafui and came to grief on the Somali coast. Looting however was a sideline in the sea trade 
developed in the Red Sea in which the early sultans played an active part. One of these, 
Maxaummud I who reigned from 1809 to 1818, took control of the main ports on the Majeerteen 
coast (now Puntland). His elder son, who succeeded in 1818, boosted trade even further by 
developing the production and merchandising of aromatic gums and incense, and built 
fortifications to protect the coastal bases captured by his father. 
In 1839, the sultan and the British in Aden reached an agreement: in exchange for an annual 
contribution and a trade contract, the Sultan undertook to protect British sailors shipwrecked in 
the dangerous Majeerteen coastal waters. Within a few decades, the Majeerteen sultans were 
thus able to consolidate their power in the region by their control of trade networks. 
The Majeerteen sultans lasted until 1927, when they were incorporated into Italian Somalia. 
 
Source: W.K. Durrill, “Atrocious misery: The African origins of famine in Northern Somalia, 1839-
1884.” The American Historical Review, XCI (2): 287-306, 1986. 
 
This brief historical background is not intended to highlight a tradition of predation 
and exploitation in the political history of Somalia. Its intention is to show how 
unexceptional this history is by pointing out that here as elsewhere, state is formed 
by the intricacy of a gradual process combined with a measure of violence and that 
the current situation is part and parcel of a reorganisation of the political order. 
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2. Economic scope of civil war: main aspects and 
developments (1991 – 2007). 
 
Resituating the political economy of violence in the long view of the formation of 
political orders should not mask the opportunities and pressures of the present, 
which inform the attitudes of everyone involved. There are two aspects to consider: 
 
- First, the structure of the political economy of violence in its early years 
(1991–1993) was strongly affected by the dynamics and stakes which were 
built up in the 1980s. 
 
- Second, the relationships between economic sectors and violence have not 
remained constant. In fact they have greatly evolved over time with different 
configurations between 1991 and now. 
 
In this section we suggest a division into periods of these changes. 
 
2.1. 1991 – 1994: the economy of plunder 
 
It was at the end of the Ogaden war and the defeat of the Somali army by Ethiopia 
(1977) that the main elements of social and political disintegration in Somalia took 
place. 
 
On the political side, armed fronts of opposition to the regime appeared, causing 
fierce repression which eventually led to the secession of Somaliland and the 
autonomy of Puntland, both of these regions being a specific target for violence by 
the regime. The militarization of Somali society – characterised by the constitution 
of armed fronts, uncontrolled circulation of weapons and a plunder culture 
introduced by the Somali military – has its roots in this movement. 
 
On the social side, at the same time there was a great amount of population 
displacement organised under the leadership of the governing powers on the pretext 
of humanitarian requirements. Populations of nomadic pastoralists from the north 
and centre of the country – victims of the 1970s droughts – were forcibly settled in 
the fertile southern plains to farm crops. The seeds of conflict between natives and 
outsiders were sown in the southern provinces, particularly with regard to land 
ownership. The influx of Somali refugees fleeing from Ethiopian Ogaden aggravated 
the urban imbalance – especially in Mogadishu – and was part of the reason for the 
durability of refugee camps. 
 
The hijacking of food aid for the refugee camps became a government habit. The 
concentration of power in the hands of a small elite organised round the Siyad Barre 
clan and allied clans4, all originating in the Darood confederation, resulted in a 
frenetic grab for government resources. All income-producing sectors (plantations, 
international aid funding, import/export businesses, etc.) were taken over by friends 
of the regime. 
                                                 
4 The nepotistic nature of the regime is summed up in the acronym MOD, the initials of the 
Mareehan clan (Siyad Barre’s clan), Ogaden (his mother’s clan) and Dhulbahante (his son-
in-law’s clan), all three clans belonging to the Darood confederation. 
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The overthrow of the regime in 1991 by the militia of the United Somali Congress 
(USC), mainly consisting of Hawiye clan members, was first perceived as liberation 
by the people of Mogadishu, who mostly come from this clan but felt they were 
occupied by the Darood because of the way the regime concentrated power. But 
before very long, the seat left vacant by Siyad Barre was disputed by two factions in 
the USC and the conflict which ensued practically destroyed the city and caused 
thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of homeless. 
 
The fall of the regime and the battle of Mogadishu also caused Hawiye fighters to 
move from the centre (mainly Habar Gedir fighters under General Aideed) to the 
southern farming regions. The ensuing armed conflicts, the renewed pressure on 
land created by the regime, the plundering and destruction of agricultural resources 
resulted in serious humanitarian crises in 1991 and 1992 in south Somalia and the 
loss of around 250,000 Somali lives. 
 
During this period, the economic basis in Mogadishu and the major part of south 
Somalia was destroyed. The leading businessmen (the richest) fled the country. 
Those who stayed – like Osman Ato – took part in the plunder and hoped to profit 
by the chaos5. Factories, urban amenities and agricultural infrastructures were 
diligently dismantled, and often sold off to traffickers. The hijacking of humanitarian 
aid became a regular thing. Trade channels (ports, airports) and natural resources 
(especially agricultural) became spoils of war. In farming areas where the Somali 
government had set up an irrigated commercial farming system, racketing of 
planters and forced labour for settled farmers became the norm (inset 3). 
 
3.  The banana war (1994 – 1997) 
 
The “banana war” episode is a good illustration of the plunder economy which developed in the 
situation of chaos in the aftermath of the regime’s fall; 
Before the civil war, banana exports were an important source of revenue for the Somali 
government, estimated at 20 million US dollars a year. Somali banana exports benefited from the 
advantageous conditions of the Lomé agreement for ACP countries. They had a preferential tariff, 
notably on the Italian market. These clauses were suspended when the regime fell and were 
renewed in 1994. 
 
The sector was then a strategic one for the warlords who tried to take control of it. In the 
production areas of lower Shabeelle, the Aideed forces racketed the planters. They did not take 
direct control of production but took a percentage of the producers’ sales as protection rights. 
 
Agreements were also made with multinationals in the sector –Italian Somalfruit and the 
American company Sombana, subsidiary of the Dole group – to ensure supplies. Both companies 
contributed to the renovation of the little port of Merca in the south to facilitate exports. 
 
The revenues generated by this trade are estimated, for General Aideed alone, at over $US 
200,000 a month. The money was mainly used for the upkeep of his military. 
 
The control of the banana production areas and trade routes was a major motive for the fighting 
in lower Shabeelle between Aideed and his Mogadishu rival Ali Mahdi, and later his ex-ally and 
bankroller Osman Ato. 
 
In 1997, the removal of the preferential trade tariffs of the Lomé agreement under pressure by 
the WTO also applied to Somalia and sounded the death knell for its banana business…along with 
the military greed it had aroused. 
 
                                                 
5 Osman Ato was at the time the main bankroller of Aideed. 
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2.2. 1994 – 2000: wartime economic revival 
 
Though it did not set off the disappearance of the predation economy, a noticeable 
change in the Somali civil war economy began in 1992-1993 when the military 
humanitarian missions arrived.6. 
 
The widespread presence of peacekeeping forces (over 30,000 soldiers in 1993) 
from the United Nations and NGO agencies created conditions of demand which 
boosted economic activity in sectors such as fuel and food supply, equipment 
shipping, etc. The UN dealt to a great extent with Somali suppliers. 
 
Businessmen who had fled the capital to set up elsewhere in the region (especially 
Dubai) returned and some of them invested in new sectors. The first private 
companies in telecommunications were founded at this time.7. 
 
The bases of a modernised legal economy were established. But massive 
humanitarian intervention also attracted less respectable business, such as private 
protection of NGOs. 
Most former fighters went into this type of business and, in spite of the weighty 
presence of international troops, both NGO agencies and American military staff 
compromised with the warlords. 
 
However, the balance of power imperceptibly started to change because, by 
investing in their own safety, Somali companies established in Mogadishu gradually 
emerged from under the yoke of the militias. 
 
2.3. 2000 – 2006: strengthening of the business 
community 
 
The Somali militias had begun to break up even before the international and UN 
troops withdrew in 1995. The earlier heavy fighting in Mogadishu had not thrown up 
any clear leading player. The armed forces present had not been able to impose 
adequate military power to set up a government. 
 
Without any political goals, they concentrated on taking over the economic 
resources within their reach. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the withdrawal of UNOSOM (in 1995) and the end 
of banana exports (1997) gradually dried up the sources of revenue for the warlords 
who found it increasingly hard to maintain their large paramilitary units. The officers 
and underlings of the main warlords left them and built their own militias. 
 
At the same time as the warlords were losing their military power, the big 
corporations which were developing their business in Mogadishu and throughout the 
region – particularly in financial dealing, telecommunications and import-export – 
                                                 
6 The first intervention (Onusom I) was from April 1992 to March 1993. It was heavily 
backed by a multinational force led by the United States (Unitaf) from December 1992 to 
March 1993. A second mandate (Onusom II) was set up from March 1993 to March 1995. 
7 For example Telecom Somalia in 1994; Barakat in 1994 (later Hoormuud); Nation Link in 
1997. 
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took charge of their own safety by funding their own militias. For the most part, 
these militias (unlike those of the warlords) existed for defensive reasons. By the 
end of the 1990s, they had displaced the warlords8. 
 
While it was organising its own safety, the business community diversified its 
activity: between 2000 and 2006, a dozen or so production units (pasta, mineral 
water bottling, soap factories, etc.) grew up in Mogadishu. 
 
The strengthening of the economic and military status of the Mogadishu business 
community in the early 2000s made a significant difference to the configuration of 
the Somali civil war. Unlike the warlords who exploited clan identity to take over 
resources (and then redistribute them to ensure a military following), the 
entrepreneurs had to build cross-clan networks to keep up their business9. 
 
The cross-clan factor in business was also found in the stockholding of the biggest 
companies (those in telecommunications and financial dealing): for one thing there 
were many shareholders but above all, the system relied on finely-balanced clan 
relationships. This type of stockholding served the dual purpose of protecting 
businesses and ensuring their establishment throughout Somalia. 
 
Moreover, though the absence of government structures exacerbated rivalry 
between the warlords, it did help favour a cooperative attitude in the business 
community. Business coordination systems were built up in southern Somalia in the 
late 1990s to lower transactions costs by sharing the use of services (security, 
organisation or transport). 
 
One of the best known of these structures is the “Benadir Business Committee”, set 
up in 1999 by several businessmen, including Abokor Omar Adani (later described 
as one of the main ICU bankrollers) and Bashir Raghe Shirar10. One of the 
committee’s main activities was the management of the port of El Maan – north of 
Mogadishu – which was the chief port in Somalia from 1999 to 2006. 
In 2006 this business group had substantial means11. It was also able to run 
sideline businesses ranging from road transport and fuel supply to 
telecommunications and international financial dealing. 
                                                 
8 A key episode showing the shift in the balance of power to businessmen occurred in 1999. 
When Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, who occupied sectors of Mogadishu, decided to set up a 
common administration for the city, the businessmen decided they would pay no more taxes 
to the warlords. Ali Mahdi and Aideed agreed but some officers – such as Muse Sudi Yalahow 
(close to Ali Mahdi) – rejected the agreement and used force to try and make the 
businessmen give in. The businessmen’s militias won the fight which followed and took 
power in the city. For this account, see especially ICG report n°45, 2002. 
9 For example, fund transfer companies (Hawalas) handling enormous sums of money from 
the diaspora (five hundred million to a billion US dollars a year were transferred in 2003 
according to the World Bank) employed agents from different Somali clans and families. 
After all, these transactions rely on trust between the parties, which in Somalia is 
guaranteed by the closeness of family relations. 
10 Cooperation by no means excluded sometimes fierce competition between businessmen. 
Thus these two men – both from the Abgaal fraction of the Hawiye clan – clashed violently 
for the control of the port of El Maan in 2006.  
11 According to a report by the Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia in 2006, 
businesses in the groups operating the port of El Maan allegedly have “hundreds of agents, 
over 600 trucks (…), 96,000 square metres of warehouse space (…) and an indeterminate 
number of ships (owned or chartered by the cartels), some of them with a tonnage of 
14000, barges, trailers, cranes, fork-lift trucks and other equipment, of a value estimated at 
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Initially built round a core of businessmen from the Abgaal fraction of the Hawiye 
clan, the cartel had power and efficiency which drew in businessmen belonging to 
other clans. 
 
Somali entrepreneurs’ security requirements and their need to reduce the cost of 
tolls and checkpoints set up by the warlords form the basis for the mutual interests 
built amongst this group, a large part of the war-weary population exasperated by 
the warlords’ exactions and the Islamic courts. 
 
It should be noted that the first Islamic courts organised round a base spread over 
districts of Mogadishu were funded by businessmen (Ali Mahdi, Abokor Omar Adani 
in particular) to introduce a minimum of law and order and control criminality. 
 
The political structuring of the UIC, and the American response which was to arm 
the warlords to counteract its power12, helped to strengthen the links between the 
business community and the UIC. The Somali business community had to choose 
between restoring control by the warlords from whom they had just freed 
themselves or by Islamic court governance, undoubtedly ideologically strict but 
liberal in its economic attitudes. 
 
In fact, in taking control of practically all south central Somalia in 2006, the UIC got 
rid of the numerous tolls carriers and merchants had to pay and reduced the port 
and airport taxes on a basis negotiated with the business community. 
A few months of this governance resulted in a steep rise in business. 
 
2.4. 2007: reorganisation in progress. 
 
In many respects, the victory of the Transitional Federal Government has led 
paradoxically less to the restoration of government institutions and security than to 
a backsliding to the worst times of predatory governance by Somali warlords. 
 
Economically at least, the current situation is a regression compared to the 
dynamics of the previous period. 
 
A large part of the UIC financial support has been lost to Somalia with the return of 
assets and part of the trading activities to Dubai or other financial marketplaces in 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
 
Several measures introduced by the TFG are likely to demoralise the business 
community.  
 
• Starting with nominations – to key positions – of warlords who are notorious 
for their predatory acts: Mohamed Omar Habib (Mohamed “Dheere”) as 
mayor of Mogadishu, or Abdi Qeybdiid as the national chief of police. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
several million dollars”. B. Schiemsky, M. Holt, H. Kelley, J. Sarck, Report of the Monitoring 
Group on Somalia, S/2006/229 (p.20) 
12 The CIA allegedly funded militia groups in the name of the “Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counter-Terrorism” (ARPCT), formed in 2006 but disbanded a few weeks later by 
the Islamic courts. 
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• An almost three-fold increase in tax on goods has caused protest by many 
merchants. The participation of warlords such as Mohamed Qanyare, Muse 
Sudi Yalahow and Omar Mohamed Mohamud (nicknamed Omar “Finish”) in 
the TFG department which imposed the measures reinforces the feeling of 
backsliding amongst the local population, since warlord extortion was the 
reason why the business community went into battle in the late 1990s. 
 
• Several entrepreneurs also fear that the martial law voted in February 2007 is 
merely an excuse for confiscating assets. 
 
• The military seal-off of the Bakaara market and the harassment of traders 
has widened the breach between the TFG and the business community. 
 
The fierce fighting in March and April 2007 contributed to the destruction of the 
small production base which had grown up in Mogadishu over the last five years. 
Military operations, the upsurge in armed violence and the reappearance of 
checkpoints and extortion caused an abrupt drop in business activity in south 
central Somalia. 
 
Without making forecasts, the current reorganisation process has the air of chaotic 
restoration giving no inkling to date of which old political economy it is returning to: 
estate government on the Siyad Barre model or warlord governance. In the short 
term at least, we could envisage a hybrid system, if the TFG manages to establish a 
formal central government. 
 
3. Economic scope of civil war: dynamics and 
players. 
 
As we have just seen in this brief review, business does not come to a halt in 
wartime: it carries on in different forms and develops alongside the established 
situation of violence. Far from being uniform, wartime business is multifunctional 
and at the service of varying interests. 
 
In a civil war situation where legal state institutions have fallen by the wayside, it is 
not easy to distinguish between the legal and illegal sectors: for example, bringing 
in goods without paying customs duty or levying taxes for an unlawful local 
authority are illegal practices. From this point of view, all business activity in 
Somalia (or most of it) can be considered illegal. 
 
More empirically, we are inclined to consider illegal any business relating to 
organised crime (dealing in drugs, weapons, human beings, etc.) or contravening 
international agreements (e.g. forced labour). 
 
An increasing number of analysts use the typology worked out by Goodhand 
(2004)13 to characterise wartime economic activity. Using situations observed in 
Afghanistan, he distinguishes three forms he describes as combat economy, shadow 
economy and coping economy. 
                                                 
13 See Jonathan Goodhand “Afghanistan in central Asia” in War economies in a regional 
context. Challenges for transformation; Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (2004), Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder, Colorado. 
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- Combat economy refers to activities which feed conflict directly – such as 
arms dealing – and sources of revenue which help to maintain armed forces. 
 
- The shadow economy covers a range of practices at the margins of legality 
and government regulation structures. Such practices (like smuggling or 
business in the so-called informal sector) may predate the civil war but when 
governments fall apart, they are swiftly taken over by criminal networks. 
 
- The coping economy develops in traditional business activities when war 
causes disruption (lack of government institutions and support services). 
 
In practice, the frontiers between the three types of wartime economy are so 
porous; it is not easy to make the distinction. For example, we could consider the 
revival of a number of business sectors in Mogadishu over the last few years as part 
of the coping economy. Yet they developed and were protected in a situation 
without government institutions and therefore needed to maintain private militias 
and, in some cases, purchase smuggled weapons in a country subject to an 
embargo. 
 
The distinction can therefore be complicated to make. However, in the context of 
steps to accompany a peace process, it can help to pinpoint the type and motives of 
the players in the civil war. For some of these, use of armed violence is basically to 
obtain access to material gains (mainly profit and power). For others, violence is 
simply a substitution for a failing state which cannot ensure the safety of property 
and people. 
 
Both attitudes lead to different stances in the economic agents in place with regard 
to restoration of a constitutional government. 
 
For the above reasons, we shall not fully apply the Goodhand analysis system in the 
following pages but describe the main motives for armed violence in Somalia and 
the types of players involved. 
 
3.1. Control of trade routes, extortion and smuggling. 
 
Taking advantage of the absence of government, a criminal economy has developed 
over the past fifteen years and, led in the main by infamous warlords, has 
generated substantial profits. 
 
Four sectors emerge as particularly lucrative: control and management of trade 
routes (via ports and airports), “sale” of rights of access to natural resources, piracy 
and smuggling. 
 
a) Control of trade routes. 
 
The control of the main ports and airports or runways is one of the main prizes of 
battle between warring factions. These hubs of communication are of strategic 
importance because it is through them that the militias are supplied (especially with 
weapons and khat). They are also used for exporting profitable local goods 
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(agricultural produce, livestock, crawfish and charcoal, and sometimes illegal goods 
such as drugs). 
 
However, the main source of revenue is the “tax” which the warlords levy on goods, 
people and carriers transiting through the ports and airports. 
 
In 2005 and the early months of 2006 (before the UIC took control of most of the 
south central towns), control of the airports round Mogadishu (Daynile, K-50, 
Baledogle) and Kismayo generated a large amount of money (millions of US dollars) 
which was divided amongst a small number of warlords. 
 
In addition to the ports and airports, the warlords and some clan-based militias set 
up checkpoints on the roads or in towns where they engaged in racketing and 
extortion of funds. 
 
The table below, based on data gathered by the Monitoring Group on Somalia 
mandated by the United Nations Security Council, lists the extortionists in the 
Mogadishu region and the locality of Kismayo, along with revenues from their 
activities in 2005. 
 
 
“Warlord” Checkpoints Annual revenue (US$) 
Daynile airport 
(“partner”) 
144,000 Osman Atto 
$4,454,640 
Afgooye checkpoint 4,310,640 
Medina checkpoint 705,600 
Darmoole checkpoint 819,000 
Muse Sudi Yalahow 
$2,532,600 
Balad checkpoint 1,008,000 
Daynile airport (“owner”) 1,287,000 Mohamed Qanyare Afrah 
$1,892,160 Bakaara checkpoint 605,160 
Ahmed Duale Gelle 
(Heef) 
K 50 airport 1,474,200 
Hawiye Abgaal Wacaysle 
fraction 
Sinai checkpoint 363,960 
Barre Hirale (Juba Valley 
Alliance) 
Kismayo airport 362,304 
Hawiye Habar Gedir Ayr 
fraction 
Baledogle airport 319,000 
Omar Finish Daynile airport 
(“partner”) 
72,000 
Ifka Halane Islamic Court Daynile airport 
(“partner”) 
36,000 
 
 
After the UIC was defeated, the TFG began taking over the control of ports and 
airports. But it was noticed in summer 2007 that checkpoints dismantled by the UIC 
were making their reappearance. Moreover, it turns out that a number of warlords 
in the list above hold positions in the TFG. 
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b) Sale of natural resources 
 
Sales of natural resources include charcoal, exports of which have shot up because 
importing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have banned domestic production within 
the last few years to conserve their own forestry resources. 
 
The sale of fishing licences for Somali territorial waters to foreign fleets (mostly 
Asiatic) is another highly profitable source of revenue for local despots. Local 
militias issue them for 80,000 to 150,000 US dollars per licence and per vessel. 
 
More recently, the sale of rights has been extended to the exploration and use of 
seabed and mining resources. 
 
c) Piracy 
 
Piracy still subsisted a bit in the latter years of the Siyad Barre regime but 
afterwards, in the absence of government, it developed and became sophisticated. 
Somali pirates have powerful launches, locating equipment (GPS, radio, etc.) and 
weapons (guns and RPG arms) to intercept ships of high tonnage (several freighters 
have been hijacked in 2007). 
 
The attacks are less aimed at taking possession of the cargoes than the capture of 
the crews so they can be held to ransom. 
 
In 2005 the Monitoring Group on Somalia identified four Somali pirate 
organisations:  
 
 
- voluntary national coastguards based in the region of Kismayo and linked to a 
local militia; 
- pirates in the region of Merca, funded by Sheikh Yusuf Indhohaade, a UIC 
leader and governor of the Bas Shabeelle province before the fall of his 
organisation; 
- the group known as “Somali Marines” operating in the locality of Haradheere 
on the coast of central Somalia, linked to the Mudug Hawiye militias; 
- the Puntland group, stemming from the Majeerteen clan. This is the oldest 
group of pirates. 
 
d) Smuggling 
 
The absence of government has long since been a contributing factor in the 
development of cross-border smuggling in the region. 
 
Because it has no customs duty, Somalia has become the entry point for goods 
circulating throughout East Africa. The smuggling circuits are all the more profitable 
because customs duty remains high in Kenya – in spite of the COMESA regional 
integration process – and Ethiopia. 
 
The traditional smuggling circuits involve the livestock trade between Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Kenya. In recent years they have branched out, drawing in Somali 
traders with substantial financial means. For example, in 2003, when Kenya was 
granted a dispensation by COMESA to raise its customs tariff on sugar, Somali 
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businessmen imported sugar from South America to be sold as smuggled goods on 
the Kenyan market. 
 
These four sectors illustrate aspects of the shadow economy which has developed in 
Somalia – often in conjunction with external operators – because of the absence of 
a central government. 
It is clear that the players in these networks – some of whom are currently close to 
or active within the TFG – are not excessively keen to see a strong central 
government in Somalia. 
 
3.2. Land stakes and access to natural resources 
 
Apart from this Mafia-like abuse, armed violence in Somalia is also prosaically 
driven by competition for access to resources and land disputes. 
 
In a context of militarised countryside, pressure on resources and deficient 
regulatory systems (traditional or state), access to pastoral resources (grazing land 
and waterholes) is often gained by deadly power struggles. 
Rural conflicts also involve right of use – between crop farmers and livestock 
farmers or, more recently, livestock farmers and wood gatherers for charcoal 
production. 
 
In Somalia, the fiercest land conflicts arise from an intricacy of interests and 
players. The situation in Kismayo and Lower Juba is probably the most outstanding 
example. 
 
Since the fall of Siyad Barre, this region has been at the heart of a relentless 
struggle where the same protagonists are involved in a game of fluctuating 
alliances: the Mareehan and Ogaden clans settled in the hinterland of the lower Juba 
valley on one hand; the Harti migrants (Majeerteen from what is now Puntland) 
mostly settled since the start of the century in Kismayo; the Hawiye Habar Gedir 
who spread in region (and all of southern Somalia) after the fall of the Siyad Barre 
regime. 
 
The stakes in the struggles are control of the port, fishing resources and the 
tradable fishing rights they bring, hinterland trade routes – especially the smuggler 
passages to Kenya – and the fertile land of the Juba valley. 
 
Tension is also aggravated by old related disputes, such as: 
 
- the challenge to the longstanding unequal trade relationship between Ogaden 
livestock breeders and the Majeerteen traders in Kismayo who export the 
livestock; 
 
- Majeerteen resentment about the repression by Siyad Barre (who was a 
Marehan) of the people in what is now Puntland because of the sedition by 
officers in the region led by the current TFG president (Abdillahi Yusuf) in 
1977. 
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The occupancy of farming land and many localities by the Habar Gedir Hawiye is 
moreover very similar to colonisation and is experienced as such by the local 
population. 
 
The new political order – with the TFG in power – undoubtedly complicates the 
situation even more. The region was controlled over the last few years by a coalition 
called the “Juba Valley Alliance” (JVA), made up of Marehan, Habar Gedir Hawiye 
and Ogaden clan members. The new alliance in power in Mogadishu, with the 
Majeerteen and Abgaal Hawiye at the head of the TFG, opposes the JVA and 
recently deposed its leader (Barre Hirale) who was a TFG minister. In June 2007, 
battles to take control of Kismayo opposed Marehan militias and Majeerteen militias 
probably from the Puntland militia contingent which formed the personal guard of 
the TFG President Abdillahi Yusuf. The aim was less to bring Kismayo into the 
national fold as to establish the hold of the Majeerteen business community on local 
resources. 
 
Because of its build-up of stakes and stakeholders, the Lower Juba region has one 
of the highest potentials for conflict in Somalia. 
 
Lastly, to conclude this brief summary of land conflicts, we should note the 
burgeoning troubles due to the oil stakes which have been revived by the recent 
exploration contracts signed by the TFG and Chinese companies. 
Political economics of war and peace in Somalia 
Agropolis International / Cirad 
16 
Conclusion: Productivity of violence versus 
profitability of peace. 
 
This overview of the political economy of violence in Somalia gives some idea of the 
variety of players involved in the war and above all their respective attitudes to the 
restoration of peace and government. 
 
The civil war which has raged in Somalia since 1991 is not a uniform process: it has 
undergone many changes and has informed political attitudes and economic 
behaviour which have also changed. 
 
Initially a consequence of rivalry between armed factions to gain control of 
government, it subsequently led to a process of territorial and political break-up 
which has prevented the emergence of supreme players. The break-up upheld a 
situation of lawlessness which favoured the development of a shadow economy and 
illegal business. The chief instigators of the process can be described as “warlords” 
who are entrepreneurs of violence and take up arms for no other purpose than to 
gain control of economic resources, part of which are reinvested in the maintenance 
and equipment of militias. 
 
This category of entrepreneurs of violence prospers by the mere fact that there is no 
functional government. They can be considered as acting to prevent the emergence 
of a government apparatus and thus undermine any peace processes, such as the 
one begun in Somalia in July and August 2007. 
 
The difficulty in the current period is due to the fact that many warlords have sided 
with the Transitional Federal Government and several of them occupy strategically 
powerful positions14. 
 
As it progressed, the civil war also unexpectedly helped to create an innovating and 
dynamic private sector working in orthodox markets (import-export, 
telecommunications, finance, building, etc.). 
 
One of the notable features of the last few years is related to the switch in the 
balance of power (in Mogadishu and various regions in south Somalia) in favour of 
the business community which freed itself from the warlords by ensuring its own 
security. 
 
With the arrival of TFG forces and the Ethiopian army in Mogadishu, the private 
company militias were disbanded. 
 
The business community has a rather ambivalent attitude to the restoration of 
government. It is true it has benefited from the absence of customs duty and 
business tax, but it has also had to cope with heavy costs to ensure the 
development and durability of its companies by investing, amongst other things, in 
security. 
 
The absence of government also creates a series of problems which seriously 
hamper business. Firstly, the non-existence of a banking system penalises the 
                                                 
14 Such as the current mayor of Mogadishu. 
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import-export trade. Though most entrepreneurs register their businesses abroad 
(mainly in Dubai), the lack of bank guarantees and letters of credit implies that 
large amounts of money must be tied up and advanced to buy goods for resale. 
The absence of a national organisation with a minting monopoly is another source of 
serious economic problems15, even though in practice the American dollar is the 
currency used for important transactions. 
 
More generally, the lack of investment in public amenities and equipment (roads, 
various infrastructures, etc.) puts business at great disadvantage. 
 
It could thus be supposed that the “demand” for government would be higher in this 
sector of the Somali economy and this is undoubtedly why many businessmen 
believe in the ability of the UIC to restore some sort of law and order in the greater 
part of south central Somalia. 
 
The success of a peace process partly depends on the ability of its promoters to 
make peace more economically profitable than violence. 
Logically, two types of converging action could make it easier to tip this balance in 
the Somali political context. 
 
The first would consist of making illegal business a criminal offence by trying the 
drivers of Mafia-like networks (warlords, but also the foreign operators they deal 
with) before the international courts of justice and by freezing their foreign assets, 
since they are mostly very well known. But, apart from a few spectacular instances 
of justice16, such a process implies collective international action and coercive 
credibility which are rarely mustered. This is why the process hardly ever gets off 
the ground.17. 
 
The second condition favouring the restoration of long-term peace is for the civil 
population of Somalia to have faith in government institutions. Though most people 
and the major part of the influent business community feel the need for 
government, this is no reason to condone the installation of a predatory government 
in the place of the warlords. 
 
From this point of view, the supremacy of the TFG is a historic opportunity for 
restored government in Somalia. 
 
Judging by the first measures adopted, this opportunity is likely to be lost. The 
threefold process which co-opts warlords, marginalises economic players close – or 
allegedly so – to the opposition (UIC) and allows friends of the TFG president to 
take over resources augurs a return to acquisitive predatory government. 
 
                                                 
15 Since 1991, minting and the production of “counterfeit” Somali shillings have been done on 
the initiative of the regional administration and still was in Puntland in summer 2007. 
16 See in particular the widely published case of the arrest and trial of the Liberian warlord 
Charles Taylor. 
17 Unfortunately, the rare attempts to “criminalise” business in Somalia turned out to be 
questionable in their intentions and disastrous in their effects. For example, the operation 
launched in November 2001 by the American authorities against the Somali funds transfer 
company “Al-Barakaat” accused of links to international terrorism led to a freeze of part of 
its assets (including funds for thousands of Somali households), the raid on its offices in 
Abu-Dhabi and the filing of its directors on the list of supporters of terrorism. To date, no 
proof supporting the accusation has been provided.  
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